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RANDITION: RANDOM BLOCKCHAIN PARTITIONING FOR WRITE THROUGHPUT 
by David Nguyen 
This paper proposes to support dynamic runtime partitioning of Tendermint, which is 
an in-development state machine replication algorithm that uses the blockchain model to 
provide Byzantine-fault tolerance. We call this variation Randition. We incorporate recent 
research from blockchain consensus and replicated state machine partitioning to allow 
Randition users to partition their blockchain for improved write performance at the cost of 
some Byzantine fault tolerance. We conduct an experiment to compare the raw write 
throughput of Randition and Tendermint. Finally, we discuss the experiment results and 
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 1 
Introduction 
The search for practical consensus algorithms for distributed and replicated state 
machines continues. As long as we have to account for problems inherent in modern 
network infrastructure and the mischievousness of human society, distributed consensus 
remains a topic of research and exploration. Three-Phase Commit was perhaps the first 
renown improvement over its more naive, two-phase sibling. Enhanced Three-Phase 
Commit (E3PC) improved upon that. Many variations and new algorithms for distributed 
consensus have been proposed since. The earliest research focused on tolerating failing 
nodes. This transitioned into overcoming network failures such as partitioning and 
message delay with the proliferation of the Internet and today’s modern network 
infrastructure. Paxos and Raft are notable algorithms in this era. Research has recently 
transitioned into tolerating Byzantine faults with the introduction of blockchain and public 
distrust of centralized systems. 
Past cryptocurrency’s promise of decentralized and unregulated money, the research 
community has realized blockchain can address the Byzantine fault weakness in popular 
consensus algorithms. The term itself is derived from Lamport, Shostak, and Pease’s 
abstract Byzantine Generals Problem, in which generals of the Byzantine army must 
decide on one action when some generals are traitors who want to prevent the loyal 
generals from reaching a consensus [1]. If a system is Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT), it 
can perform reliably in the face of some malicious nodes actively attempting to stop or 
fail consensus. Note that this tolerance also covers: failing nodes, network partitions, 
and message delays that are the result of hardware problems—since one might not be 
able to distinguish the difference between a hardware failure and a Byzantine party. 
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A general survey of blockchain technology will reveal that blockchains are essentially 
distributed databases and replicated state machines. These lend themselves to 
participation by the general public through numerous blockchain-specific consensus 
protocols. This explains the terms distributed and public ledger [2] [3] [4] as common 
descriptors of blockchain. As of 2019-02-28, Bitcoin transaction throughput has topped 
at 425,008 daily confirmed transactions according to statistics provided by Blockchain 
Luxembourg S.A. [5]. That equates to approximately 17,709 transactions per hour and 
295 transactions per minute. Median confirmation time for an individual transaction for 
that month is roughly 10 minutes. Ethereum transaction throughput has topped at 
1,349,900 daily confirmed transactions according to statistics provided by BitInfoCharts 
[6]. That equates to approximately 56,246 transactions per hour and 937 transactions 
per minute. Median confirmation time for an individual transaction for that month is 
usually less than 20 seconds. Suffice to say, these performance metrics are outmatched 
by virtually all conventional database systems—even distributed databases—available 
now. 
Background 
Tendermint is a proof-of-stake consensus algorithm that can replicate a state 
machine while tolerating Byzantine failures in up to one-thirds of nodes or validators [7]. 
Given at least two-thirds are non-Byzantine and correct, the algorithm can guarantee 
safety, liveness, and even accountability. Validators maintain their own copy of a 
replicated blockchain and take turns proposing blocks (just large batches of 
transactions) in rounds. Two voting phases and two well-defined lock rules ensure that 
no correct validators accidentally fork the blockchain by getting too far ahead of the 
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consensus, thereby providing safety. Liveness is provided in the unlock conditions that 
accompany the locking rules and in block proposal timeouts. Byzantine fault testing from 
the authors and Jepsen—a third party distributed consensus testing firm— [8] confirmed 
effective Byzantine fault tolerance. The Tendermint team’s own performance testing 
reveals a maximum throughput of approximately ten thousand transactions per second 
with specific configuration settings. 
Tendermint consensus achieves both safety and liveness with rather simple rules. 
Again, two voting phases and two well-defined lock rules ensure that no correct 
validators accidentally fork the blockchain and always commit the same block at the 
same height. The pre-vote and pre-commit are the two voting stages [7]. The pre-vote is 
for preparing the network to take action regarding a block proposal. If a validator pre-
votes for a block, then it is indicating the block is valid and that the network should 
prepare to commit it. Otherwise if a validator pre-votes nil, then it is indicating that the 
network should prepare to move onto the next round, perhaps because a block proposal 
it received is invalid or one never arrived. The pre-commit is for voting to fully commit a 
block. If a validator votes nil in this stage, then it is indicating that the network should 
move onto the next round. If a validator votes for a block in this pre-commit stage and 
the block does not get committed for whatever reason, then the validator is considered 
locked on that block. The prevote-the-lock and unlock-on-polka are the two lock rules. 
Note that a polka is defined as two-thirds consensus. The prevote-the-lock rule is 
defined as “a validator must pre-vote for the block they are locked on, and propose it if 
they are the proposer” [7]. This prevents validators in a network from committing 
different blocks at the same height and guarantees safety. The unlock-on-polka rule is 
defined as “a validator may only release a lock after seeing a polka at a round greater 
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than that at which it locked” [7]. This prevents validators from being perpetually locked 
on a block and guarantees liveness. 
In general, a Tendermint network attempts to commit a block in every round. If a 
round results in a successful block commit, then that committed block constitutes a new 
height of the underlying blockchain. Each round consists of the following phases: 
propose, pre-vote, pre-commit, and commit. Of course, a new round can be triggered 
from any phase as soon as consensus failure or timeout is detected. We leave detailed 
explanation of how a single round is processed to [7]. However, we wish to note that at 
every round, the block “proposer is chosen by a deterministic and non-choking round 
robin selection algorithm that selects proposers in proportion to their voting power.” [9]. 
The following is a simplified explanation of this algorithm: at the beginning of each round, 
all validators move forward in a priority queue by an amount equal to their voting power; 
the validator with the highest priority is selected as the block proposer and it then moves 
backward in the queue by an amount equal to the total voting power of the network. Of 
course, additional logic handles edge and error cases. A formal proof for this selection 
algorithm is not yet available, but public testing does indicate the algorithm is indeed 
deterministic, fair, and Byzantine-fault tolerant. 
Algorand’s BA* is another consensus algorithm that bears close resemblance to 
Tendermint. To clarify, Algorand refers to a cryptocurrency and BA* refers to Algorand’s 
consensus algorithm. Algorand tolerates up to one-thirds Byzantine nodes, nodes each 
maintain their own blockchain copy, and nodes propose blocks of transactions for the 
blockchain. However, BA*’s proposer selection and voting phases are distinct. The 
author utilizes a cryptographic sortition algorithm that uses distributed verifiable random 
functions (VRFs) to randomly determine one proposer out of all eligible nodes [10]. Once 
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the proposer proposes a block, the same sortition algorithm is utilized to randomly 
determine voting committees of tunable size, which proceed to perform one phase of 
voting. There is a minimum of four of these repeated voting committees. Given an 
Algorand network where up to one-thirds of nodes are Byzantine, there is the negligibly 
small possibility of a fork if each phase repeatedly chooses voting committees that are 
compromised by Byzantine nodes. BA* includes logic to reach consensus on a single 
fork to maintain safety and liveness. Because of this consensus scheme, Algorand easily 
scales to tens of thousands of nodes and hundreds of transactions per second in testing.  
Much blockchain research is devoted to private and permissioned blockchains for 
business and enterprise use cases. However, researchers do concede transaction 
performance of popular private and permissioned blockchains often leave much to be 
desired. Frameworks like Blockbench are being developed to provide potential users 
with valuable benchmark and analysis of private blockchain systems. Following an 
analysis of experiment results, the authors of Blockbench suggest that blockchain 
developers can apply design principles from existing proven database systems to 
improve blockchain. One notable suggestion is to implement sharding or partitioning to 
reduce computational costs and improve transaction processing speeds [11]. Enterprise 
relational databases such as those from IBM [12], Oracle [13], and Microsoft [14] have 
long used data partitioning to great effect in significantly improving overall transactional 
query performance for workloads on large stores of data. Users essentially use 
partitioning keys to instruct their database to deterministically divide individual data 
records onto discrete partitions, which can usually be defined on any combination of 
discrete storage volumes. This tends to increase read performance because database 
optimizers can take advantage of data partition awareness to easily “prune” their query 
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plan. This tends to increase write performance because the database can distribute 
storage write operations across physical storage and essentially parallelize expensive 
storage drive writes. 
As such, we can consider the cost of writing data to physical storage to be a major 
bottleneck in transaction processing performance. However, the same bottleneck 
generally does not apply for current blockchain solutions. Where storage read and write 
are expensive for relational or other classical databases, consensus is often the 
expensive operation and bottleneck for blockchains [11]. Conveniently, data partitioning 
a blockchain can also provide some of the performance benefits we observe in more 
classical database systems. Before blockchain, distributed state machine replication 
(SMR) did not scale well mainly because of synchronization (or consensus) overhead. 
Each node had to receive and execute all transactions. Nogueira, Casimiro, and Bessani 
observe that partitioning such systems into shards can achieve scalability, but note that 
most implementations that use partitioning don’t do so in a very elastic manner [15]. 
They propose a modular partition transfer protocol to allow node groups to split and 
merge with minimal impact on performance. This protocol for elastic state machine 
replication basically involves splitting a node group into two or more sub-groups, where 
each partition is tasked with ensuring synchronization until they can act independently 
and the entire system correctly routes transactions to relevant partitions. 
Dasu, Kanza, and Srivastava from AT&T Labs-Research propose a compelling and 
practical scheme of blockchain partitioning into sub-chains. They define Proof-of-
Location as a mechanism to achieve distributed consensus, where a location certificate 
proves the geospatial location of a node to a network that potentially spans the planet 
[16]. They also posit that location-based partitioning is practical for blockchains whose 
 7 
purpose is to store and transfer coins of monetary value, because users are likely to 
send such coins to nearby users and rarely to those located far away. This blockchain 
partitioning scheme has the likely side effect of increased transaction throughput, since 
network delays are significantly minimized and sub-chains can commit blocks in parallel. 
This particular work stops short of implementing an example blockchain and presenting 
performance metrics. 
Goals and Hypothesis 
We hypothesize that Tendermint’s primary transaction processing performance 
bottleneck is in its consensus. As more validators join a Tendermint network, we surmise 
it generally takes more time to reach two-thirds consensus which can contend with 
relevant consensus timeouts the user defines at network configuration time. In other 
words, larger network sizes impose greater requirements to reach consensus. This 
bottleneck results in limitations on practical network sizes. Tendermint’s creators only 
test their system with a maximum of 64 validators and test results indicate it only 
reaches ten thousand write transactions per second when less than 16 validators are 
participating in consensus [7]. Tendermint supports adding validators while the system is 
running, but this only increases average consensus time and degrades transaction 
throughput. We believe write throughput maximum is improved if Tendermint takes 
advantage of the concepts presented in the partition transfer protocol [15]. We propose a 
Tendermint variant that: borrows from this partition transfer protocol, defines how it does 
partition formation, takes advantage of Algorand’s cryptographic sortition algorithm, and 
specializes in partitionable workloads to provide significant transaction and network 
scalability. 
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We call this variant Randition. 
We understand this involves some safety compromises. First, allowing Tendermint’s 
validator network to become partitioned means the entire system’s Byzantine-fault 
tolerance is based off the smallest partition’s validator count. We believe this is an 
acceptable compromise and that users must decide if they will tolerate 10 Byzantine 
validators in a 64-validator network that’s partitioned down the middle or 21 Byzantine 
validators in a single-partition 64-validator network. Second, supporting partitioning 
means allowing a sort of network partition to occur, which completely compromises 
safety if a Byzantine validator is allowed to propose the partitioning scheme. We resolve 
this issue by further proposing that Randition implement Algorand’s cryptographic 
sortition algorithm [10] to allow the network to autonomously and safely partition itself. 
Figure 1 describes our high-level architecture. Randition will implement partition 
formation logic within Tendermint round processing to allow the blockchain to randomly 
partition. This formation logic will take advantage of Algorand's cryptographic sortition for 
safe partition formation. Discussions of safely and liveness in [15] shall guide us on the 
correctness of our partitioning scheme and logic. 
 
Figure 1: High-level architecture of Randition’s partition formation 
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We wish to distinguish this partitioning operation from the common network partition 
or blockchain fork terms in computer science research. These terms possess negative 
connotation and suggest a severe failure in a network or blockchain. On the contrary, 
this project intends to improve performance in a Randition network by carefully 
partitioning the blockchain into sub-chains that can safely process independent tasks. 
Similarly, we intend to safely partition the blockchain to improve performance for use 
cases where it is acceptable (e.g. outside of blockchains facilitating money generation 
and transfers, such as in Bitcoin). 
This effort focuses on proving that blockchain write performance is significantly 
improved when purposefully partitioning a blockchain. Therefore, our specific goal is to 
observe notable improvement in mean transactions committed per second and mean 
blocks committed per second. Furthermore, we do not: measure mean transaction 
commit time or validate transaction linearization. We merely focus on Randition’s ability 
to commit as many transactions as possible in a time frame instead of what it commits 
within a time frame. The prototype will not have any cross-partition read capability, but 
we do discuss how this might be implemented in future iterations. Safe partitioning of the 
blockchain is also a priority, but we leave proving the safety of our partitioning scheme in 
future iterations of our work. 
Assumptions 
To maintain a reasonable scope of work, we make the following assumptions about 
the expected use cases for our Randition prototype. 
Randition assumes that users will initialize the network with each validator having 
equal or approximately equal voting power. Our integration of cryptographic sortition into 
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Tendermint has dependencies on validator voting power. For simplicity, we discuss our 
changes and prototype tests assuming each validator has equal voting power. We later 
discuss the implications of widely varying voting power, but do not perform tests on such 
possibilities. 
Tendermint allows users to define some peers with a voting power of zero, which will 
only allow the peer to observe consensus [17]. For more details, refer to the Tendermint 
section. Non-validator peers only expect to observe consensus between all the 
validators in a network and will not readily support observation of two or more sub-
networks with each performing their own consensus. We discuss the possible 
usefulness of peers in the presence of multiple partitions, but do not intend to support 
this and test such a configuration. Further, Tendermint allows users to add peers 
(including validators) during runtime. However, given the aforementioned assumptions, 
Randition also does not support the runtime addition of peers to a network or sub-
networks. We discuss the usefulness of runtime peer addition in partition transfer (see 
the Adapted Partition Formation and Future Work sections for more insight), but do not 
intend to support this and test such an event. 
Tendermint possesses some degree of crash recovery—such as the use of write-
ahead logging in both the consensus reactor and mempool—to aid in correct state 
restoration and resumption of consensus participation. Similar to how Tendermint peers 
do not readily support observation of multiple sub-networks, they will also not readily 
support resuming consensus with multiple sub-networks following a crash. Minor 
updates should easily allow a crash-recovering validator to detect which partition they 
belong to, but we do not intend to support and test this. Of course, crashing a peer is 
well within the abilities of a Byzantine entity, but we expect Tendermint’s existing 
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methodology for recovering from crashes to be sufficient protection and coverage. 
Additionally, we consider the safety of crash recovery to be orthogonal to that of partition 
formation. 
Our partition formation protocol currently requires 100% consensus, which means 
every validator must participate in partition formation within a network-wide time frame 
and time out. Of course, this is counter-intuitive in our understanding of how blockchains 
do and should work: consensus should be achieved with a majority of votes instead of all 
of the votes. However, we put forth the notion that this is acceptable in a permissioned 
or private blockchain environment where initial network configuration is performed by a 
trusted user who also controls runtime network reconfigurations. In that context, consider 
that networks should perhaps only partition when this trusted user commands that all 
validators attempt to form partitions at the same time. For users who desire majority 
consensus and more flexibility, we discuss an alternative partition formation scheme in 
the Future Work section. 
Overview 
This section begins by discussing the relevant technical aspects of Algorand’s 
cryptographic sortition and partition transfer in elastic state machine replication. It ends 
by detailing the implementation of these algorithms in Randition and other supporting 
modifications. 
Cryptographic Sortition 
Verifiable random functions (VRFs) [18] are an essential component to Algorand’s 
cryptographic sortition. Given a private key sk and value v as input, function F outputs a 
 12 
seed x and proofx. [18] proves that seed x is pseudo-random and unpredictable. Anyone 
who knows sk’s public key pk can utilize verification function V (consider this an inverse 
operation of function F) with input pk, seed x, proofx, and value v to determine if seed x 
is indeed valid. 
Algorand developed the cryptographic sortition algorithm to randomly and non-
interactively select users based on their voting power or weight [10]. In order for 
Algorand to support this algorithm, a pseudo-random seed value must be maintained in 
the blockchain. Before Algorand begins, initial seed0 must be selected either by a trusted 
agent or distributed random number generator and known to all users. At every 
subsequent round, each block proposer (also known as user u) computes the seed for 
round r as follows: 
<seedr, π> ← VRFsku(seedr-1||r), where π is proof of seedr‘s validity and VRFsku represents 
the execution of the VRF with user u’s secret key. 
Equation 1 [10] 
Of course, proposer u’s public key is known by every other user. Proposer u includes 
the output seedr and proof π in its block proposal. As part of block validation, all other 
users validate u’s seedr with π. If the block is approved for commit, the block is 
appended to the blockchain along with seedr. However, if the network deems seedr from 
proposer u invalid, then the remaining users will compute the seed for round r as follows: 
seedr = hash(seedr-1||r), where hash is a cryptographic hash function. 
Equation 2 [10] 
Since the hash function must be identical across the network, the same seed will be 
computed. Furthermore, since all correct users must have identical copies of the 
blockchain, all users will have access to the same seed. 
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Figure 2 summarizes the sortition algorithm [10]. In short, a pseudo-random hash is 
produced from the blockchain’s public seed concatenated with the desired user role, 
such as the proposer role or a voting committee identifier. Probability p is defined as the 
desired number of users τ out of the total weight W between all the users and is the 
probability an individual unit of weight or voting power is selected by the algorithm—
more on this later. A pseudo-random number in the interval [0, 1) is calculated by 
dividing the hash by the maximum numerical value of the hash. The interval [0, 1) is also 
divided into w = j consecutive intervals as defined by the given cumulative distribution 
functions. The algorithm checks if the pseudo-random number falls within the defined 
intervals in order. As soon as the number does, the algorithm returns the amount of 
weight or voting power selected. Naturally, the first of the consecutive intervals is very 
large and has a high probability of causing the algorithm to return j = 0. Each following 
interval is smaller than the last, causing the algorithm to return a high j with low 
probability. 
 
Figure 2: The cryptographic sortition algorithm [10]. Licensed under CC BY 4.0. 
Let us explain and clarify probability p with an example: suppose in a network we 
have 8 nodes (n = 8) with 10 weight each (w = 10). This equates to a total network 
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weight of 80 (W = 80). If we want to randomly select approximately 4 out of the 8 nodes, 
at minimum we want cryptographic sortition to reveal the winners by selecting 
approximately 1 individual weight (the term coin makes more sense in this context) per 
desired node. This means: 4 weight / 80 weight—or rather: 4 nodes / 80 weight—
equaling the desired number of users out of the total network weight. In this case, p = 
0.05. Since sortition might not precisely select a desired number of nodes, additional 
logic such as repeated executions might be required.  
Figure 3 summarizes the sortition verification algorithm [10] and is essentially the 
inverse of the sortition algorithm. If a node is selected and publicly broadcasts the results 
of their sortition, anyone can verify the results with this algorithm. Cumulatively, the 
sortition and verification algorithms are essential in providing safe and deterministic 
selection of committees. 
 
Figure 3: The cryptographic sortition verification algorithm [10]. Licensed under CC BY 
4.0. 
Partition Transfer 
[15] iterates that modern state machine replication primarily provides fault tolerance 
at the cost of scalability and adding replicas tends to exacerbate this tradeoff. Although 
recent research already propose partitioning to improve scalability, these tend to not be 
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very elastic in that they don’t excel at dynamically partitioning at runtime. Nogueira, 
Casimiro, and Bessani propose a modular partition transfer primitive and protocol in the 
state machine replication model. Their objective is to enable most state machine 
replication protocols to implement partitioning with minimal impact to performance and 
minimal requirements from the SMR protocol. Their protocol can be summarized in 
Figure 4 [15] and the following 6 steps: 
1. Group G receives a partition transfer request from a trusted agent. 
2. Each replica in G sends its state S to a matching replica in new group L. During 
this entire stage, updates on S are logged in cache ∆. 
3. Each replica in group L accepts state S when it receives and verifies matching S-
hashes from enough replicas in group G. 
4. Each replica in G sends its cache ∆ to its matching replica in group L. From now 
on, group G stops serving requests that L should be handling and redirects such 
requests to L instead. 
5. Each replica in group L accepts cache ∆ when it receives and verifies matching 
∆-hashes from enough replicas in group G. 
6. When group G receives enough acknowledgement messages from group L, it 
reports the partition transfer request results back to the trusted agent. 
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Figure 4: The partition transfer protocol [15]. Reprinted with permission from the authors. 
The protocol notes that consensus is only required at the beginning of steps 1 and 4. 
In step 1, consensus is required for all replicas to start partitioning in a synchronized 
manner. In step 4, consensus is required for the replicas in group G to stop processing 
requests for the transferred partition in a synchronized manner. 
 17 
Tendermint 
Tendermint promises to never fork as long as less than one-thirds of validators are 
Byzantine [7]. Our proposal represents a significant change to Tendermint’s core 
processing to allow an intentional fork or partition on our terms. We also contended with 
the beta state of Tendermint and the volatility of its source code. While Tendermint’s 
core design remains the same, observation of Tendermint’s code repository [9] and 
public documentation [17] over time indicate the entire product is in a constant state of 
improvement and refactor. Modifying a specific version of Tendermint alleviated most 
relevant problems. As such, we only worked with and discuss Tendermint version 
0.24.0. 
From a user standpoint, Tendermint initialization involves using the init command to 
initialize the required files on disk for an individual node, which includes the: config, 
private validator, and genesis files [17]. The private validator file contains the node’s 
public-private key pair. Users need to modify the config and genesis files to include the 
entire network’s IP addresses and public keys, respectively. Once the network starts, 
nodes will attempt to dial and gossip with their given peers and verify messages with 
their known peer public keys. Tendermint distinguishes between peers and validators. 
Peers are simply the terminology for a node participating in the network and validators 
are simply peers with voting power. This means non-validator peers: have zero voting 
power, can only observe, and keep up with consensus. After initialization, user 
applications can use Tendermint’s API(s) to send transactions and replicate. The 
EndBlock request is one such interface that allows user applications to execute logic at 
the end of every block commit. 
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Tendermint has a notion of reactors, which are concurrent processes that run 
alongside the main process and are responsible with helping the validator participate in 
the network [7]. It does so in part by utilizing a switch object to broadcast messages to 
the entire network, thereby generating gossip. The main reactors are the blockchain, 
consensus, and mempool reactors. The blockchain reactor is responsible for fast-
synching the validator with the rest of the network when it is behind on consensus. The 
consensus reactor is responsible for participating in consensus, such as by gossiping 
votes and committing blocks. The mempool reactor is responsible for caching, verifying, 
and gossiping application transactions in the mempool. The mempool can be considered 
a cache for transactions that have not been committed in a block. 
It is important to note that while a transaction is in a validator’s mempool, queries 
from any validator in the network will not observe the results of this transaction. 
Therefore, Tendermint does not employ an eventual consistency model. Rather, it 
employs what we consider a mostly strong consistency model. Let us clarify. All writes in 
Tendermint must be completed through transactions, which require consensus to 
commit. Here, there is strong consistency in data writes. On the other hand, reads in 
Tendermint are not required to be completed through transactions. Users can simply 
query the local validator without consensus or other serialization. This method is 
computationally cheap and quick, but might return stale data [7]. However, users have 
the option of performing queries as transactions to avoid reading stale data and ensure 
they’re seeing the latest state. The downside is users might have to wait on the order of 
hundreds of milliseconds to seconds for a response. Here, the user can choose between 
strong consistency and “slightly weaker” consistency in data reads depending on their 
requirements. 
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Tendermint’s Validator Set Update protocol [7] [17] is integral to our effort. It is 
triggered when the user application specifies a new validator set at the EndBlock 
request. Adding a new validator is simply a matter of providing the new validator’s public 
key and desired voting power to the current set. Updating an existing validator is a 
matter of specifying the desired voting power. Removing a validator simply requires 
specifying a voting power of 0. Note that updates specified in height H will take effect in 
height H+2. 
Adapted Cryptographic Sortition 
We modify Tendermint’s consensus reactor and engine to maintain a pseudo-
random seed value at every height in the blockchain. We adapted Algorand’s algorithm 
for maintaining such a seed with the following primary differences: 
• In Algorand, a hash function is used to determine a new seed if the network 
doesn’t accept the proposer’s seed. In Randition, the network continues moving 
onto the next proposer until a valid seed is proposed. 
• In Algorand, a new seed can be determined in each round. In Randition, a new 
seed is determined in every block or height. 
When it is time for a Proposer to propose a block, it executes Equation 1 to obtain a 
candidate seed and seed proof. These are included in the proposal and the proposal is 
broadcasted to the network for voting. Randition considers the proposal’s seed and seed 
proof as integral to the validity of the proposal itself. Therefore, if the network determines 
the seed and proof as invalid, then the network will vote against the proposal and the 
next Proposer will be selected. 
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To facilitate and easily manage blockchain partitioning, we define a new partition 
reactor in Randition that is responsible for the following: 
• tracking the validator’s partition and partition status 
• tracking the network’s partitions and their status 
• using sortition to attempt to form partitions 
We found it necessary to define partition phases so that the main process and 
various reactors can determine what stage of partitioning a validator is in. The following 
phases are numbered and are set depending on the following conditions: 
0. The default phase; the validator is not in a partition and partitioning has not been 
requested. 
1. The validator’s user application has requested partitioning and the validator is 
waiting for the required sortition messages to arrive. 
2. The validator has received all required sortition messages and partitions have 
formed. 
3. The validator has removed all extra-partition peer validators from its peer list. 
4. The validator and network is fully partitioned and partitioning is active. 
Phase 0 can be considered the default state. When a network is initialized and 
started, all validators begin in this state. Phase 1 is primarily used by the main process 
to determine if a new partitioning key should be accepted or ignored. Phase 2 is 
primarily used by the partition reactor to track the state of partition formation. Phase 3 is 
used by the main process to track the state of partition formation. Phase 4 is when a 
validator can consider itself fully partitioned. Tendermint’s Mempool and mempool 
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reactor depend on this phase to determine if transactions should be categorized as intra- 
or extra-partition. Figure 5 illustrates the valid transitions between the phases. 
 
Figure 5: Partition reactor states 
We modify Tendermint’s external EndBlock request to allow a user to set a new 
PartitionKeys string array with regular expressions, or regexes, that inform Randition 
which partitions to sort transactions into. Let us consider these partitioning keys 
synonymous to those found in relational databases that support data partitioning. For 
example, suppose that we replicate a key-value store with a Randition network and 
suppose that the user application specifies the following 2 regexes for PartitionKeys: 
(4=) and (5=). If the network successfully partitions itself, then one partition will only 
commit transactions where the key is 4 and the other partition will only commit 
transactions where the key is 5. 
We also modify Tendermint’s external BeginBlock request with the Partitioned 
boolean to inform the user application if and when partitioning is active. Note that 
Randition does not inform the user application exactly which partition it is assigned to. 
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Randition’s current design does not require partition awareness from the user 
application. This results in implications we discuss later. 
For every round the PartitionKeys array is set, the main process will instruct the 
partition reactor to attempt to partition the network. Whenever the reactor receives this 
local partitioning request, it will perform sortition using the procedure described in Figure 
2 and broadcast the results to the network. We provide the same input parameters that 
Algorand does into the procedure except for the role parameter, which indicates what 
proposer slot or voting committee a node is competing for. In Randition, the role 
parameter indicates which partitioning key a validator wants to partition on. To be 
specific, the role parameter in Randition is actually a hash of the entire partitioning key to 
maintain a uniform parameter size. 
Whenever the partition reactor receives sortition result broadcasts from peer 
validators, it will either cache the broadcast if the reactor is not aware of a partitioning 
request or validate the broadcast using the procedure described in Figure 3 if the reactor 
is waiting for consensus on partition formation. As soon as any validator has verified 
sortition results from every other validator (equating to 100% consensus), the reactor 
forms partitions and instructs the main process which partition the validator is a part of. 
At this point, the validator communicates mainly with intra-partition validators and 
partitioning is complete—at least until the PartitionKeys field is set to request partitioning 
again. Note that since total consensus is required, user applications should request 
partitioning at roughly the same time or block height. 
Randition uses cryptographic sortition to partition a network into sub-networks while 
Algorand uses it to select small committees. In Algorand’s case, there are “winners” of 
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sortition and the prize is getting to propose a block, vote on a block, etcetera. In 
Randition, what prizes do winners get? Presumably, there shouldn’t be any better 
partition. We use cryptographic sortition for individual validators to randomly and non-
interactively determine their place in a priority queue. From there, Randition can more-
or-less evenly divide validators into partitions by picking from the front of the queue and 
assigning them in round-robin order. Recall that cryptographic sortition selects users 
based on their voting power. Therefore, validators with more voting power will have a 
higher chance of being closer to the front of this queue. Figure 6 describes our current 
partition formation scheme: 
procedure formPartition(sortitionResults) 
    sortByTimesSelected(sortitionResults) 
    i ¬ 1 
    while validator ∈	sortitionResults do 
        if i % 2 == 0 then partition1Vals ¬ validator 
        else partition2Vals ¬ validator 
    partitions ¬ < partition1Vals, partition2Vals > 
    return partitions 
Figure 6: The partition formation scheme 
Note that sortByTimesSelected() breaks ties on times selected with the higher hash 
sorting higher. Note that formation into only 2 partitions is supported at this time, 
although the scheme could easily be improved to support a dynamic amount of desired 
partitions. 
The novel use of cryptographic sortition in partition formation is that each validator 
forms partitions independently from each other following one phase of sortition message 
exchange with every other validator. Consider a Byzantine validator who wishes to trick 
another validator into joining the wrong partition or multiple partitions. By the time this 
Byzantine validator determines which validators belong to which partitions: the partition 
 24 
formation is complete, there are no additional phases or message exchanges, and no 
chances to influence partitioning. Of course, a Byzantine validator can completely stop 
partition formation from occurring with our current 100% consensus requirement by not 
sending any messages at all, but the key here is that they cannot corrupt partition 
formation and configuration. 
To reiterate, Tendermint is a state machine replication system. User applications 
need not concern themselves with how many other replicas exist. Users can reasonably 
assume all correct validators have the latest identical state. However, with our proposal 
to allow partitioning we potentially break user and application assumptions. Partitioning 
could mean user applications must be aware that sub-networks exist. It could also mean 
users must concern themselves with how many states there are and which validators 
house which transaction partition. We develop Randition with every intention to make 
partitioning and partition states as abstract as possible. For example, we intend for the 
PartitionKeys field to be a user request for better performance at the cost of Byzantine-
fault tolerance rather than a request that requires further action or knowledge on the 
user or application’s part. 
Adapted Partition Formation 
Randition is very much inspired by [15]’s proposal and we don’t precisely implement 
their defined protocol. Instead, we rely on it to provide valuable guidance and insight 
towards maintaining safety and liveness during blockchain partitioning. For example, 
partition transfer specifies “having one single replica in the source group transmit to one 
single replica in the destination group [because] this design option makes our system 
bandwidth-efficient in multi-rack and virtualized environments” [15]. However, individual 
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Tendermint validators communicate via broadcasts to the entire network instead. We 
choose to preserve and take advantage of this gossip mechanism instead of 
implementing pairwise communication. 
Step 1 of the partition transfer protocol requires consensus to begin the partitioning 
process and Randition defines consensus to be a partition request from every validator 
in the network or a sub-network. In this context, the replicated user applications are 
collectively the trusted agent. We consider the user application to be trustworthy 
because Tendermint’s authors state “transaction verification is the responsibility of the 
service that is being replicated” [19]. Randition could potentially require only two-thirds 
consensus instead of 100% consensus and this is discussed later. 
Steps 2 to 5 of the partition transfer protocol assume that group L is not state 
synchronized with group G and might be new additions to the whole network. However, 
our adapted cryptographic sortition will determine groups G and L from the network’s 
existing nodes. Since the network should always be consistent before and during the 
partitioning process, these four steps aren’t necessary. Suppose a scenario where a 
user doubles the size of a blockchain network at runtime, one can consider this 
effectively introducing a group L that is not synchronized with the existing nodes in the 
network. At the moment, Randition does not support runtime addition of peers during 
partitioning. We believe an equivalent alternative would be to utilize Tendermint’s 
Validator Set Update and Fast Sync protocols to synchronize new group L with existing 
group G and then initiating partitioning requests network-wide. 
Step 6 defines the success condition for the partition transfer protocol, which is: the 
new partition contains common state S, the new partition contains cache ∆, and both 
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partitions are correctly processing new requests. Randition defines this success 
similarly: partition formation succeeded and all the partitions are correctly processing 
new transactions. 
Consider the following Randition’s version of the partition transfer protocol: 
I. Group G receives a partition transfer request from a trusted agent. 
II. Group G collectively and consistently determines new groups L1 and L2, known 
as partition formation. 
III. Groups L1 and L2 cease participating in consensus with each other and continue 
consensus locally. 
IV. Groups L1 and L2 report the partition transfer request succeeded to the trusted 
agent. 
[15] defines the requirements for compatibility with their partition protocol and they 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. All system processes communicate messages through fair channels and that all 
messages will eventually be received at the destination, regardless of network 
problems or delays. 
2. The distributed system is partially synchronous where it “can behave 
asynchronously for an unknown period of time, not respecting any time bound on 
communication or processing, but eventually will become synchronous” [15]. 
3. The system possesses an external trusted component that can trigger group 
reconfiguration operations, such as partitioning. 
Tendermint fulfills Requirement 1 because it satisfies atomic broadcast for 
consensus [7], which includes block proposal of data and vote gossip in consensus. 
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Regarding Requirement 2, Tendermint states it is weakly synchronous, meaning that 
messages for each stage of consensus must be communicated within a user-specified 
time, otherwise Tendermint moves on to the next stage following this timeout. This 
definition is stricter than that of partial synchrony [20]. But assuming that Tendermint 
users specify reasonable timeouts in which the non-faulty majority of validators can 
eventually finish sending and receiving messages, then we can assume Tendermint 
fulfills Requirement 2. The latest formal update from the Tendermint team clarifies that 
their protocol operates in a partially synchronous model [19]. Tendermint fulfills 
Requirement 3 by trusting the replicated user application to handle group reconfiguration 
operations, such as usage of the Validator Set Update protocol in Tendermint’s 
EndBlock request interface. 
[15] states the partition transfer protocol fulfills safety and liveness in the following 
ways: 
• Safety 1: once partitioning completes, “the transferred partition will not be part of 
the source group state and will be part of the destination group state” [15] 
• Safety 2: “linearizability of the service is preserved by the partition transfer” [15] 
• Liveness: partitioning eventually completes 
Randition satisfies Safety 1 due to Steps II and III. Partition formation in Step II 
ensures two independent partitions and Step III ensures independent “group states” and 
data consistency because every partition does not process extra-partition requests. 
Randition satisfies Safety 2 because Tendermint satisfies state machine safety [7] and 
will continue to do so after partitioning completes due to Step III, where the majority of 
validators in any partition is expected to continue Tendermint’s consensus protocol. 
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State machine safety guarantees total order for blocks committed and transactions 
therein. 
Randition satisfies Liveness because all of the Steps I through IV must terminate. In 
Step II of our protocol, the partition reactor will only wait as long as a round for all of the 
required sortition messages to arrive. If they do and they are all valid, partition formation 
occurs and completes independently. If they do not, then Tendermint carries on and 
another partition request must be made in a future round. Steps III and IV execute 
independently of other intra-partition validators. Step III relies on execution of 
Tendermint’s Validator Set Update protocol, which must terminate before a new block is 
proposed. Step IV is completed once Tendermint responds to its BeginBlock interface, 
which must occur before each new block commit. 
We make the following additional comparisons between the original partition transfer 
protocol and Randition’s partitioning protocol: 
• The partition transfer protocol states that consensus is required in Step 1 and 4 
to ensure that partition transfer begins consistently for group G and exits 
consistently for both groups G and L. More specifically, consensus in Step 1 
ensures that the majority of group G generates identical state S and cache ∆. 
Additionally, consensus in Step 3 ensures that the majority of group G: finally 
sends identical state S, finally sends identical cache ∆, and stop executing extra-
partition requests in a synchronized manner. There is a distinct focus on data 
consistency at these stages. 
o Our partitioning protocol only requires consensus in Step II and prioritizes 
consistency in partition formation. Randition relies on Tendermint’s 
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existing block consensus mechanism to maintain data consistency and 
our partition formation processing does not interfere with this mechanism. 
Before partitioning, Tendermint’s consensus protocol promises data 
consistency. During partition formation, Randition continues behaving as 
though the network is unchanged. The partition reactor independently 
deals with partition formation and doesn’t effect change in the main 
process or other reactors until formation is finalized and complete. 
Therefore, data consistency is maintained. Partitioning is activated using 
Tendermint’s Validator Set Update protocol, which only occurs between 
block proposals. After partition activation: a validator only accepts block 
proposals from intra-partition Proposers, we effectively observe partitions 
that independently perform block consensus, and data consistency is 
maintained within each partition. 
• The partition transfer protocol makes minor notes in Steps 4 and 5 regarding 
group G ceasing service requests for partition PS and redirecting them to group L 
while group L waits to finish receiving cache ∆ before servicing these PS-related 
requests. These finer detail specifications are for maintaining data consistency 
and we make the same point as above regarding our focus on consistency in 
partition formation. We continue to rely on Tendermint’s existing block consensus 
mechanism for data consistency. 
Consider Figure 5, where each partition phase is represented as a state in a state 
machine. This begs the question regarding if state transitions are safe and live. Can a 
correct validator be coerced into incorrect states or forced to not terminate? Internally, 
the partition reactor is only concerned with these phases. The rest of Randition—
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especially Tendermint’s core and mempool reactor—is mainly concerned with whether 
partitioning is fully activated or not. This results in two similar but separate concerns. 
One: whether state transitioning is safe and live within the partition reactor between the 
5 phases; and two: whether state transitioning is safe and live outside of the partition 
reactor (e.g. the core and mempool reactor) between partitioning being fully activated or 
not. Note that Phase 0 and 4 are at-rest states the partition reactor can remain in for an 
extended period of time. Phases 1 through 3 are transitionary and all of them should 
ideally be completed within several—if not one or two—rounds. 
Both safety concerns are addressed by the definition of Phase 1: the validator’s user 
application has requested partitioning. More specifically, a correct validator cannot be 
coerced to transition outside of Phase 0 by a Byzantine entity. If the validator’s user 
application incorrectly requests partitioning, the validator will trust the user application 
and the validator itself is no longer correct. We showed that the transition through Phase 
2 by a correct validator cannot be corrupted by a Byzantine entity. Phases 3 and 4 are 
informational and determined by Tendermint’s round processing. As long as Tendermint 
can continue processing rounds, then Phases 3 and 4 are guaranteed to execute 
correctly. 
The primary liveness concern lies in Phase 1, where the validator is waiting for the 
required sortition messages to arrive. As long as the partition reactor is in Phase 1 and 
100% consensus has not been achieved, the partition reactor (and the network as a 
whole) will continuously execute and gossip sortition for each new round in an attempt to 
form partitions. We purposefully allow users to constantly retry since requiring 100% 
consensus within one or two rounds is admittedly a rather lofty expectation. Other than 
successfully transitioning to Phase 2, the only other way to guarantee termination of 
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Phase 1 is for the user application to explicitly request cancellation by providing an 
empty PartitionKeys array in the EndBlock request. We emphasize that while the 
partition reactor remains in Phase 1, Randition is able to continue consensus and round 
execution, because Randition’s core is mainly concerned with whether partitioning is 
fully activated or not. Phase 2 terminates because partition formation is completed 
independently of other validators and merely a matter of executing the partition formation 
scheme indicated in Figure 6. As before, Phases 3 and 4 are informational and 
determined by round processing. As long as Tendermint’s round processing maintains 
liveness, then Phases 3 and 4 are guaranteed to terminate. 
After partitioning is activated, the Mempool begins distinguishing between intra- and 
extra-partition transactions. This is merely achieved by checking if this partition’s 
partitioning key—which is a compiled regular expression at this point—returns a match 
in a transaction. Following Tendermint’s design, all transactions are cached in the 
Mempool. However, Randition ensures transactions that are designated extra-partition 
are never proposed. They are retained only for gossip and gossip optimization. The 
gossip routine in the mempool reactor will repeatedly read the cache and broadcast 
each transaction to the entire network. At the end of every block commit, these extra-
partition transactions are flushed from the mempool to minimize the performance side 
effects of a large transaction cache containing never-committed transactions. 
Note that Randition does not take additional action for extra-partition data that was 
already committed before partitioning. Therefore, a validator in a partitioned network will 
have stale data, as indicated by Figure 7. Given a data partition Pp,v, where p is the 
partition identifier and v is the data state version, observe that the extra-partition data 
that a validator possesses will become increasingly stale as more blocks are committed 
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to each blockchain partition. We leave handling stale data and ensuring correct query 
output to future work. 
 
Figure 7: Data partition states 
As a clarification, transactions in Randition are gossiped by the mempool reactor 
normally between all other peers a validator is connected to. What each validator does 
with a transaction is up to them. However, the same cannot be said for proposal, block, 
and vote gossip via the consensus reactor. Recall that validators are merely peers with 
voting power. Therefore, a validator will readily gossip messages with peers, but will only 
trust messages originating from other validators. In the case where a validator belongs 
to a partition, it will readily gossip with extra-partition validators, but will only trust 
messages originating from intra-partition validators. Messages that require verification 
are signed by the originator and this includes proposals, blocks, and votes. Tendermint’s 
current design will only gossip signed messages after they’re cached, and a validator will 
only cache messages after it ensures the message is trustworthy by verifying the 
signature or by checking if it expects the message from the originator at all. 
Implementation 
Tendermint’s source code is written in Golang (also known as Go), an open source 
programming language whose development is led by Google [21]. Of course, our 
modifications were completed entirely in Golang. Our changes to Tendermint consist of 
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approximately 1600 lines of code. Randition utilized Coniks’ verifiable random function 
library [22]. Both Tendermint and Coniks use Ed25519 [23] as their public-private key 
system, but their precise implementations vary enough so that Tendermint keys cannot 
be used in Coniks and vice versa. As such, each validator is modified to store Coniks-
compatible keys for use when calling the Coniks VRF. 
Several milestones were defined to create goals of smaller scope and to prompt 
assessment of the prototype feasibility given code complexity and time constraints. The 
first major milestone was to partition a simple 8-validator network into 2 predetermined 
partitions of 4 each. This involved finalization of infrastructure code to initialize the 
desired number of validators with the correct configuration files. The completion of this 
milestone was marked by initial definition of the partition reactor and correct execution of 
partition processing logic in the main execution loop. The second major milestone was to 
randomize the partitioning. This involved modifying Randition’s block processing to 
include pseudo-random seed generation with Coniks’ VRF library. The completion of this 
milestone was marked by our implementation of cryptographic sortition and achieving 
identical partition formation across all validators. Functional testing was greatly aided by 
Tendermint’s excellent logging capabilities and conventions. 
The third and final major milestone was to demonstrate that randomized partitioning 
did result in increased write performance. This involved repeated network performance 
testing against Tendermint and Randition and gathering benchmark data. System testing 
was greatly aided by Tendermint’s benchmark tooling. However, much automation and 
infrastructure needed to be developed to repeatedly: 
1. deploy a large 32-validator network 
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2. prepare the network for testing by committing a small batch of transactions 
and/or partitioning the blockchain 
3. schedule benchmarks to begin simultaneously on all validators 
4. fetch, parse, and archive benchmark results 
Results 
All experiments occur on Digital Ocean servers of size s-2vcpu-4gb (2 vCPU and 4 
GB of memory) running 64-bit CentOS 7. All instances are located in Digital Ocean’s 
SFO2 (West Coast United States) region to minimize the effects of network delay. Each 
server is initialized using Tendermint-provided Terraform and Ansible scripts for 
automated network deployment. We modified these scripts to also perform a clock sync 
and additional Linux package installation to support synchronized testing and 
benchmarks. We rely on Tendermint’s tm-bench tool to generate data and benchmark 
the network. Each validator is configured to execute: Tendermint, Tendermint’s example 
kvstore user application, and tm-bench on-demand. All validators are configured to 
connect directly to each other to minimize the effects of network topology. 
Tendermint’s main configuration file, the config.toml file, is customized by: 
• setting the moniker, or peer name to a unique identifier 
• disabling mempool logging in the log_level setting 
• disabling empty block commit in the create_empty_blocks setting 
• significantly increasing the mempool size to 250,000 
• significantly increasing the mempool cache_size to 500,000 
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We avoid tuning the remaining settings and leave them as defaults to emulate a 
more out-of-the-box and off-the-shelf user experience. 
Each transaction in our test workload is generated by tm-bench and we selected a 
transaction size of 500 bytes. Each transaction is an amalgamation of pre-determined 
and pseudo-random hex-encoded data. New transactions are generated by mutating 
bytes 16 through 31 of the previous transaction with pre-determined data and by 
replacing bytes 40 through 89 of that transaction with new pseudo-random hex-encoded 
data. Our experiments rely on the 81st byte to be pseudo-random during transaction 
generation, because we modify the example kvstore application to partition with the 
following regular expression partitioning keys for 2 partitions: ^.{80}[0-7] and ^.{80}[^0-
7]. These partitioning keys will result in approximately half of the total transactions 
generated being committed in the first partition and remaining half becoming committed 
in the second partition. 
Repeating experiments consisted of the following workflow: 
1. reset the network to restore the original configuration and block height 0 
2. prime the network with 1 transaction per second for 20 seconds per validator 
3. wait 30+ seconds for network activity to settle 
4. benchmark the network with the desired transaction rate for 20 seconds per 
validator 
5. fetch the network and tm-bench logs to gather statistics 
We are mainly interested in observing transaction throughput after the blockchain 
partitions itself. Therefore, we prime the network with a low transactions-per-second rate 
to ensure the network is partitioned and that benchmarking does not occur near the 
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partition boundary or any partitioning processing. We focus on committed transactions 
per second and committed blocks per second as calculated by tm-bench to be the basis 
for transaction throughput. For Randition, overall committed transactions per second is 
defined as the sum of transactions committed per second by all partitions in the network. 
Since tm-bench might report slightly varying results for each validator in an individual 
partition, we first calculate the committed transactions per second per partition to be the 
mean average of intra-partition tm-bench outputs. We use the same definition for 
committed blocks per second. 
Our experiments primarily vary the input transactions per second per validator in a 
32-validator Randition network and compare the results to those from a 32-validator 
Tendermint network on the same workload. We vary the input transactions per second 
per validator between 25, 50, 75, 100, 150, and 200. That translates to 800, 1600, 2400, 
3200, 4800, and 6400 input transactions per second over a whole 32-validator network. 
Figure 8 compares transactions committed per second between Tendermint and 
Randition. Note that the error bars indicate the standard deviation. 
 
Figure 8: Committed transactions per second 
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These results are comprised of 12 executions per input rate for Tendermint and 16 
executions per input rate for Randition. 
Figure 9 compares blocks committed per second between Tendermint and 
Randition. Note that the error bars indicate the standard deviation. 
 
Figure 9: Committed blocks per second 
Discussion 
To reiterate: this effort focuses on proving that transaction write performance is 
significantly improved when safely partitioning a blockchain. In Figure 8, we can observe 
that Tendermint and Randition output similar performance up until approximately 800 
input transactions per second for a 32-validator network. However, past a threshold 
between 800 and 1600 transactions per second, Tendermint’s performance begins to 
degrade and unable to empty the Mempool and commit transactions as quickly as they 
arrive. Randition reaches its peak committed-transactions-per-second past Tendermint’s 
peak and continues to maintain better performance than that of Tendermint. In Figure 9, 
we can observe that Randition commits more transactions per second mainly because 
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the overall network can communicate and commit more blocks in a time frame. Note that 
by default, Tendermint is configured to process approximately 1 block per second [17] 
but Randition seemingly exceeds that limitation simply because there are 2 partitions 
committing blocks independently while all the validators in each obey the same 
configuration settings. 
Since our tests involve virtually the same network configuration and workload 
generation, we suggest this performance improvement in Randition is a direct result of: 
blockchain partitioning, dividing the cost of consensus, and parallelizing consensus. We 
further suggest that the performance bottleneck primarily lies in Tendermint’s consensus 
protocol, at least for a mostly-default network configuration of 32 or more validators. We 
later discuss the implications of careful tuning and other network configurations. In a 32-
validator network, consensus between 2 networks of 16 validators—all of which remain 
gossiping with each other—is easier to achieve than consensus between 32 validators. 
To push the example further, it is easier for 2 groups of 16 nodes to independently 
determine consensus with a two-thirds majority of 11 nodes versus a group of 32 nodes 
with a two-thirds majority of 22 nodes. Naturally, network gossip and consensus 
requirements will tend to increase non-linearly with more participating nodes. We 
consider the following part of consensus costs: 
• computational processing required for proposals, blocks, and votes 
• time required for proposal, block, and vote messages to arrive to achieve 
consensus 
The amount of gossip or gossip overhead also contributes to the improvement in 
transaction processing performance. Recall that Randition will only gossip messages it 
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verifies and will not gossip extra-partition proposals, blocks, and votes. On the other 
hand, Tendermint will gossip these consensus messages between all validators. This 
translates to a notable reduction in gossip in Randition since each validator will 
effectively ignore—but still receive—these consensus-related messages from half of the 
original network. One might consider this a natural optimization of blockchain 
partitioning, but only if users could tolerate less resilience in the face of Byzantine 
network partitions. Of course, Randition could be modified to gossip these extra-partition 
messages to “restore” and emulate Tendermint’s gossip scheme, but we leave this to 
future work and analysis. 
As an aside, Tendermint supports transaction rechecking, which will revalidate all 
remaining transactions in the mempool against the newest block state following a 
commit [17]. Rechecking is a fairly expensive operation and tuning guides suggest this 
feature be disabled for workloads that don’t require transaction revalidation. In scenarios 
where this revalidation becomes the transaction throughput bottleneck, partitioning 
should alleviate the cost of this operation because Randition does not send extra-
partition transactions to be rechecked against the user application. The user might 
observe more performance benefits if the user application must incur significant delays 
from operations such as read/write serialization and storage I/O as a result of transaction 
checking. 
One might see that none of our results approach the roughly 10,000 committed-
transactions-per-second that Tendermint’s original experiments achieve [7]. However, 
we note that these numbers were achieved with specific conditions. The authors note 
that “an artificially high TimeoutPropose is used (10 seconds), and all other timeout 
parameters are set to 1 millisecond. Additionally, all Mempool activity is disabled (no 
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gossiping of transactions or rechecking them after commits)” for their first set of raw 
throughput experiments [7]. We further note that 16-or-more-validator networks 
struggled to reach this 10,000 transactions-per-second threshold. This reveals that 
tuning the network will likely result in significant improvements in transaction processing 
performance and that Randition users should certainly do so in production environments. 
However, partitioning a network after tuning it is not a focus of this project and we leave 
such experiments to future work. However, we do expect that users who combine 
network configuration tuning and partitioning will likely observe excellent transaction 
write performance. 
Of course, we do concede that Randition configuration could potentially be tuned to 
nullify or worsen the effects of partitioning the blockchain. In general, we expect users of 
partitionable blockchains to perform partitioning after carefully evaluating potential 
benefits and costs. We also concede that gossip and network delay could potentially 
become the primary bottleneck if an extremely large network size is used (Algorand 
proposes supporting tens of thousands of nodes) and no optimizations are in place 
within Randition to ignore or manage excessive gossip. In this scenario, blockchain 
partitioning would be ineffective. We leave further speculation and related 
experimentation to future work. 
While the focus of this project was to demonstrate that blockchain partitioning is 
certainly viable in improving transaction write performance, we also reiterate that the 
partition formation scheme is integral in demonstrating that partitioning is actually safe to 
use and that the network can partition with safety and liveness. We have demonstrated 
in the Adapted Partition Formation section that Byzantine validators cannot coerce the 
network into performing incorrect partition formation or trick a validator into joining the 
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wrong or multiple partitions. However, other attack vectors are possible outside of our 
partition formation scheme. Fortunately, Tendermint’s modular design and reactor 
concept aids in minimizing the effectiveness of a Byzantine entity. 
Future Work 
As we’ve explicitly stated thus far, Randition requires much improvement and 
iteration to approach becoming a useful application. This particular effort has focused on 
developing a prototype to demonstrate feasibility. For example, Randition currently only 
supports partitioning into 2 partitions once. Relatively minor modifications to Randition 
should allow it to partition into any number of partitions as many times as the user 
desires as long as Byzantine fault tolerance can be maintained. Recall that crash 
recovery support also requires minor changes to Randition. 
One major functional defect still present in Randition is that the acceptance of the 
required sortition messages (the transition to Partition Phase 2) is truly single-phase. 
Recall that as soon as a validator receives all the required sortition messages, it’ll move 
to complete partitioning. However, suppose that a validator in a Randition network 
somehow doesn’t receive the last required message due to a network partition or 
Byzantine entity. All other validators will move onto partitioning and this remaining 
validator will assume the network is unchanged. There is currently no mechanism for a 
validator to persist correct sortition messages for gossip or to request old ones from 
peers. We commonly encountered this defect during experimentation, but deemed the 
occurrence was tolerable given the constraints we define early in the Results section. 
Additional work is necessary to support this, and we could take inspiration from 
Tendermint’s Fast Sync feature to assist us. 
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Increasingly useful and more difficult improvements will involve reevaluations of 
Randition’s ability to maintain safety and liveness. Such improvements follow: 
• Support for varying voting power between validators. 
• Support for non-validator peers. 
• Support for runtime addition of peers following partitioning. 
Recall that Algorand’s cryptographic sortition selects users based on their voting 
power and that this effort assumes all validators possess the same voting power. 
Naturally, given a network with widely varying voting powers, validators will not have the 
same chance of being selected. However, recall that in our current partition formation 
scheme the “winners” of sortition merely guarantee themselves close-to-first place in a 
priority queue to be added round robin into multiple partitions. As long as there are no 
outliers in a distribution of varying voting power, partition formation should result in 
partitions with similar cumulative voting power. Additionally, given the random nature of 
cryptographic sortition, similar cumulative voting power might not be practically 
achievable with smaller network sizes. We admit that if voting power varies too widely 
relative to the network size, partitioning is likely not a wise or recommended course of 
action (as it is with tuning any other setting Tendermint or another blockchain might 
have). 
Previously, we state that Tendermint supports non-validator peers, which can be 
considered validators with zero voting power. Much design would be required to enable 
such a peer to observe a network of multiple partitions. It could easily participate in 
Mempool gossip. However, how would it participate in consensus gossip? Would it be 
specially configured to trust all validators (via public key) in the network to do so? Which 
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blocks would this peer commit, if any? And how? On the other hand, relatively little 
additional work would enable such a peer to observe consensus and participate in 
gossip with one partition, since a single Randition partition behaves much like a 
Tendermint network. Overall, the specific role that a non-validator peer would play in 
Randition currently eludes us. We leave architecture and design of such support to 
future work. 
Remember that Tendermint supports runtime addition of peers (with or without voting 
power), but Randition does not support such runtime addition during and after 
partitioning. Currently, the only opportunity for a user to add validators to a Randition 
network would be to utilize Tendermint’s Validator Set Update and Fast Sync protocols 
to synchronize a new set of validators with the existing set before any partitioning and 
then initiating a partitioning request. Runtime addition of peers following any partitioning 
requires more modifications. Also recall that Randition never informs the user application 
what partition it belongs to and the user application is essentially not partition-aware. To 
add a peer in Tendermint, a user would ensure the new peer’s public key and desired 
voting power is added at the same time across the network via the EndBlock request. 
However, if we wanted to use the same scheme in Randition, a user would have to 
ensure the new public key and desired voting power is added at the same time on every 
peer’s user application in the desired partition. This would require partition awareness 
and arguably add unnecessary burden on the user application to handle peer addition in 
a fully partitioned state. We leave architecture and design of handling peer addition into 
a partitioned Randition network to future work. 
One notable, but minor security defect remains in Randition. Let us suppose a 
Byzantine entity that is capable of corrupting any number of validators at any time and 
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directing any of these validators to send any message to other validators. One possible 
attack vector would be to simply simulate the PartitionKeys field being set. This will 
cause the main process to instruct the partition reactor to attempt partitioning and 
gossiping sortition result messages. A Byzantine entity could go further and send other 
validators fake sortition result messages that appear to originate from different 
validators. The partition reactor has a message cache that temporarily stores sortition 
messages that a validator doesn’t expect or cannot verify yet—perhaps because this 
validator will receive a late partitioning request. Of course, the reactor will verify these 
messages as soon as partitioning is requested. Currently, there’s no signature 
verification for entry into this cache, so Byzantine entities can denial-of-service (DoS) 
attack this cache to: prevent or delay partition formation, crash the reactor, and perhaps 
crash the entire validator itself. We leave resolution of this defect to future work and 
testing. 
Tendermint configuration provides several message-wait timeouts as part of its 
weakly synchronous model. We suggest a new setting named timeout_partition in 
Randition configuration that defines how long a validator waits in Partition Phase 1 
(sortition message wait) before automatically cancelling and falling back to Phase 0. 
Currently, user applications can explicitly cancel partitioning requests to achieve the 
same effect, but we suggest this setting as an improvement to liveness and to provide 
users with additional tuning opportunities. 
We concede that 100% consensus is an unrealistic expectation in permissioned and 
even private blockchains. Tendermint’s modular design allows Randition’s partition 
formation scheme to be highly flexible and we believe a wide variety of schemes can be 
implemented with little additional work. Therefore, we suggest a partition formation 
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scheme that requires only two-thirds majority consensus as a possible improvement 
over our current one. In Randition’s current partition formation scheme, cryptographic 
sortition is used to randomly and non-interactively determine validators’ places in a 
priority queue to be sorted round-robin into partitions. In this situation, there are no 
“winners” as there are in Algorand. However, we return to Algorand’s usage of 
cryptographic sortition by suggesting that all validators in a network perform sortition as 
a lottery to decide which group of validators will secede from a Randition sub-network 
and form a new partition. Informally: once a validator has received sortition results from 
two-thirds of the network’s validators, the set of validators with the highest number of 
selections by sortition that form the smallest partition size can transition onto Phase 2 
and form their own partition; the remaining validators must accept this and also form 
their own partition. Figure 10 describes this new partition formation scheme. 
procedure secede(sortitionResults) 
    sortByTimesSelected(sortitionResults) 
    i ¬ 0 
    min ¬ minimum partition size 
    while i < min do 
        validator ¬ pop(sortitionResults) 
        seceders ¬ validator 
        i = i + validator.size 
    return seceders 
Figure 10: The secession scheme 
Note that sortByTimesSelected() breaks ties on times selected with the higher hash 
sorting higher. Also note that a minimum partition size can be determined either by a 
number of validators or by a total voting power. 
Again, validators will not have the same chance of being selected given a network 
with widely varying voting powers. In this scheme, validators with more voting power will 
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have a higher likelihood of selection and winning the lottery. Supposing a network in 
which there is a Byzantine participant, it is arguably likely that any winners are leaving 
behind a partition containing a validator that’s misbehaving—unless the Byzantine entity 
is being more subtle. We leave detailed design and analysis of such a scheme to future 
work. 
Robust query or read support was not implemented in Randition and attempting to 
query a validator following partitioning will return correct intra-partition data and stale 
extra-partition data. Currently, one would need to know which validator belongs to which 
partition to ensure correct data reads. Of course, we intend for user applications to not 
concern themselves with partitioning and we wish for Randition to fully support reading 
correct extra-partition data from any validator. Naively, we suggest the following data 
read scheme: when a validator receives an extra-partition query, it forwards the query to 
one or few of the appropriate extra-partition validators it knows of and returns the result 
to the user. Optionally, the validator could forward the request to all extra-partition 
validators to achieve majority consensus. Of course, this scheme isn’t viable for any 
read-intensive user application. We therefore suggest a major change to Randition 
whereby each validator observes consensus for all other partitions while maintaining 
consensus processing on a primary partition. This scheme requires more processing 
and would likely diminish the write throughput improvement we observe, but ensures 
that each validator is data consistent. Similar blockchain sharding and partitioning 
schemes have been proposed in academia. We leave architecture and design for 
querying or reading data to future work and we could borrow from state-of-the-art 
research into weak or eventual consistency models. 
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Randition currently cannot scale downwards, because we have not implemented 
partition merging. Such a feature would allow users to perform load scaling for 
applications with volatile workloads. Given a dissolving and a solution partition in a 
Randition network, we naively suggest a scheme in which: 
1. all validators of the solution partition play back all blocks from the dissolving 
partition since the initial partitioning event 
2. all validators of the dissolving partition reset 
3. all validators of the dissolving partition take advantage of Tendermint’s Fast Sync 
to synchronize with the solution partition. 
We do not propose each partition play back the other partition’s blocks since that 
would result in differing blockchains across the merged partition. We leave 
implementation or improvements of this design to future work. 
As of the publication of this effort, Tendermint has released version 0.31.5 while 
Randition is based on Tendermint 0.24.0. We did not routinely pull in updates from 
Tendermint to avoid the overhead of repeatedly accounting for changed design and 
behavior. An informal review of Tendermint 0.31.0 logic and discussions since 
Tendermint 0.24.0 reveal notable improvements in mempool performance in addition to 
general improvements in consensus, gossip, etcetera. We leave merging the latest 




To conclude, we show that blockchain partitioning can provide significant write 
performance improvements at the cost of some Byzantine-fault tolerance. While the 
performance improvements we observe are likely unsurprising, the key to this paper lies 
in our partition formation scheme and how Randition can do so safely and with liveness. 
Conceptually, our ideas can potentially be incorporated into any state machine 
replication algorithm or model that satisfies the partition transfer protocol requirements. 
We admit that our partitioning scheme might not be desirable for public, permissioned, or 
perhaps even private blockchains, but we do believe use cases exist for Randition. We 
wish to thank the Tendermint and Algorand teams for developing and publishing 
Tendermint and cryptographic sortition, respectively. We also thank the developers of 
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